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Theories of happiness usually consider happiness as something that matters to us 
from a first-person perspective. In this paper, I defend a conception of public 
happiness that is distinct from private or first-person happiness. Public happiness 
is presented as a feature of the system of right that defines the political 
relationship between citizens, as opposed to their personal mental states, desires 
or well-being. I begin by outlining the main features of public happiness as an 
Enlightenment ideal. Next, I relate the distinction between the political and the 
personal to the distinction between having normative reasons for a particular 
political arrangement and merely having a „pro-attitude‟ towards a state of affairs 
that accords with one's preferred definition of happiness. Following this, I 
demonstrate why well-being, understood as a normative rather than a purely 
descriptive conception of personal happiness, nevertheless cannot serve as a 
normative reason in the political domain. In the final section, I show why 
normative reason-giving matters for the relationship between citizens, and how 
such reason-giving relates to public happiness. 
 
Introduction 
Is happiness a mental state or a prudential value? Is it a function of pleasure, the 
satisfaction of desires, or the satisfaction of preferences? Is happiness equivalent to 
well-being, or merely a contributor to well-being? Is happiness the highest good, or 
merely one good among others? The debate about happiness is an intractable one.
1
 
However, beyond the quarrel over definitions, philosophers generally agree that 
happiness is something that matters to us from a first-person perspective. That is to say, 
happiness is viewed as a matter of what persons – subjectively or objectively, correctly 
or mistakenly –; feel, want, need, prefer, aim for, desire, believe, or value on their own 
behalf, whether considered individually or aggregated across groups. 
In this paper, I consider happiness from another point of view, namely that of the 
citizen. While a citizen is necessarily also a person, she is a person in her specific 
capacity as a member of a political society: someone whose status is wholly defined by 
the system of rights and obligations vis-à-vis her fellow citizens. One's identity as a 
citizen is entirely relational, and the relation itself is defined by a system of law rather 
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 For a helpful overview, see Feldman (2010) and Haybron (2003, 2008). 
than by accident, individual choice or natural affiliation. My claim, then, is that 
happiness understood from the point of view of the citizen – which I will call public 
happiness – is neither equivalent to nor merely an extension of happiness understood 
from the point of view of the private person, and that there are reasons for happiness 
that are only available to us in our capacity as citizens, regardless of how happy we 
might be in other respects. Public happiness, so understood, is a feature of the political 
relationship between citizens and not of their personal beliefs, psychological 
propensities, or conditions for flourishing. 
This is a normative rather than a descriptive claim. My aim is not to examine how 
we happen to distinguish between public and private happiness in practice – on the 
contrary, we often fail to draw this distinction – but to provide reasons for why we 
ought to draw such a distinction, and to draw it in a particular way. I must also 
emphasise that this argument does not turn on any particular definition of private or 
first-person happiness or well-being. My project is to defend the distinction between 
public and private happiness, however the latter is defined, and to work out a particular 
definition of public happiness in light of this distinction. 
I begin with a brief discussion of the eighteenth-century concept of public 
happiness, broadly understood as the freedom of citizens to decide the laws that bind 
them. I show, further, that public happiness is a function of the distinction between 
citizen and person that is central to the idea of the social contract. In the following 
section, I explain this distinction in terms of the difference between having normative 
reasons for particular political arrangements and merely having a „pro-attitude‟ towards 
a desired state of affairs. Next, I demonstrate why well-being – while it is a normative 
rather than a purely descriptive conception of happiness – nevertheless cannot serve as a 
normative justification for any political order. In the final part of the paper, I take a 
closer look at normative reason-giving in the political domain and explain how it relates 
to public happiness. The aim throughout is to defend a conception of public happiness 
that is neither an extension of private happiness, nor an end to be pursued for its own 
sake, but a feature of the system of right that defines our civic relations. 
 
The concept of public happiness 
While there are examples of earlier use, the phrase „public happiness‟ first came to 
prominence through the work of the eighteenth-century Italian political economist 
Ludovico Antonio Muratori. The concept was subsequently taken up by the 
philosophers of the French Enlightenment, most notably Rousseau (see Bruni 2006; 
Stutzer & Reggiani 2014). Rousseau employs the notion of „public happiness‟ (le 
bonheur public) to distinguish the free participation of the citizen in political affairs – 
specifically, in law-giving – from both the natural pleasures of human beings in their 
pre-social state, and from happiness founded solely on self-interest.
2
 He further argues 
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 I am here relying on Rousseau's essay „On public happiness‟ („Du bonheur public‟), which was not 
published in his lifetime, but which nevertheless contains the key distinctions between individual and 
citizen, nature and political institutions, our duties and our inclinations, that are central to his published 
works. The original can be found in Rousseau (1964). For an insightful analysis of the tensions in 
Rousseau's conception of public happiness, see Shklar (1969: pp. 193–197). 
that it is both impossible and undesirable to derive the criteria for political decision-
making from individuals‟ personal conception of happiness. For one thing, even if we 
presume that human beings seek to arrange their societies in such a way as to promote 
their individual happiness, the many discrepancies between our political systems prove 
that individuals have different conceptions of happiness. Moreover, it is often the 
members of the „best governed‟ societies who complain most about their government 
(Rousseau 1983: p. 5). Hence, argues Rousseau, we have to accept that it is impossible 
to devise a form of government that takes its direction from the conceptions of 
happiness held by its individual members: „political government should not mould itself 
on the situation that best suits the wishes and the dreams of each individual. If it is to be 
effective, it has to follow more general rules‟ (ibid.). Since individual happiness is 
variable, these „general rules‟ could not be derived from personal conceptions of 
happiness, and they could not compel people to live happily. Instead, „the best [a 
government] can do is to give them an opportunity to do so if they are rational beings‟ 
(ibid.).
3
 
Rousseau's conception of public happiness should be understood in light of the 
distinction between the private and civic or public self that is central to the idea of the 
social contract. The starting assumption here is that the mere existence of a state is not 
sufficient proof that it ought to exist, or that it ought to exist in its present form. Instead, 
the state, as defined by a system of law, stands in need of moral justification, and the 
citizens are the ones to whom such justification is owed. Such justification, in turn, 
cannot be derived from the interests and desires the members of the polity happen to 
have, since the mere fact of them having such interests and desires does not yet tell us 
whether these ought to be codified into law. While one is who one is – a particular 
constellation of needs, wants, aims and desires, all of them potential sources of 
(un)happiness – living in a state brings with it moral obligations that arise solely from 
the legal relationship between citizens and not from their individual predispositions. 
Rousseau's concern, then, is to work out a conception of happiness that is founded on 
this contractual relationship itself, rather than on our extra-political inclinations.
4
 
The Enlightenment notion of public happiness has also served as an inspiration for 
the revolutions of the eighteenth century. A number of revolutionaries – most notably 
Jefferson and Adams in America and Robespierre and Saint-Just in France – explicitly 
endorsed public happiness as a specific kind of political freedom (Arendt 1963: pp. 
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illusions as to what happiness is (and no one can prescribe to others how they should attain it) make all 
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1991: p. 80). 
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 There is a difference between the moral contractualism inaugurated by Rousseau and the 
contractarianism introduced by Hobbes. While Hobbes and modern-day contractarians, such as David 
Gauthier, view the social contract as a bargain based on rational self-interest, moral contractualists such 
as Rousseau, Kant, Rawls and Scanlon argue that the terms of the contract require normative justification, 
and that such justification cannot be reduced to the rational self-interest of individuals. (For a useful 
overview of this distinction, see the edited collection by Darwall 2003.) My own argument falls squarely 
within the moral contractualist camp. 
114–117; Geuss 2002). As Hannah Arendt explains in her seminal analysis of the 
American and French Revolutions: 
This freedom they called later [ … ] „public happiness‟, and it consisted in the 
citizen's right of access to the public realm, in his share in public power [ … ] as distinct 
from the generally recognized rights of subjects to be protected by the government in 
the pursuit of private happiness even against public power, that is, distinct from rights 
which only tyrannical power would abolish (Arendt 1963: p. 123).
5
  
The most important insight for our purposes is that being free from tyrannical rule 
and having one's rights protected by the government is not yet the freedom to participate 
in politics. Conversely, while a government might rule according to the laws of the 
realm and allow individuals to pursue their own happiness, it can still be tyrannical, if it 
arrogates all decision-making power to itself and insists that citizens „mind their own 
business‟ (Arendt 1958: pp. 220–221; 1963: p. 126). Arendt further draws on Aristotle 
to argue that the term „tyranny‟ does not only apply to the actual rule of the few over the 
many, but also to forms of democracy in which the citizens no longer operate as a 
plurality of individuals who have to establish laws by way of mutual agreement, but as 
an undifferentiated collective in which the „many‟ have become „one‟.6 For Aristotle, a 
demos that recognises no formal, legal distinction between individuals, or between 
personal and public matters, has constituted itself as „monarch‟ that has usurped all 
powers of decision and disregards the manifold judgements of the individual citizens 
(Arendt 1958: p. 221; Aristotle Politics 1292a 13). The signature feature of tyranny is 
therefore not that it deprives its subjects of personal happiness or well-being, but that it 
deprives citizens of the freedom to decide the laws under which they must live. This 
deprivation, in turn, can take the form of the deliberate exclusion of citizens from 
political participation, or as the reduction of such participation to the expression of a 
single viewpoint. 
I offer this brief historical overview of the concept of public happiness in order to 
draw out four important features of the concept that will play a role in my own 
argument. In the first place, public happiness refers to the freedom of citizens to decide 
the laws that bind them. In the second place, this freedom is not merely the absence of 
tyranny or constraint; nor is it merely a means to happiness in our private lives – since, 
as we have seen, private happiness is compatible with tyrannical rule. For this reason – 
and this is the third feature – public happiness is itself predicated on the distinction 
between the private person and the citizen. Finally, public happiness is not a 
perfectionist ideal on which human beings naturally converge and which therefore 
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 Arendt also claims, however, that both the American and the French Revolutions ultimately betrayed the 
public happiness that they had claimed to endorse – in the case of the Americans, by opting for 
representative rather than a more direct form of democracy; in the case of the French, by making the 
alleviation of suffering rather than the establishment of enduring political institutions their central concern 
(Arendt 1963: pp. 63, 79, 82–86). 
6
 It is for this reason that Arendt remains critical of Rousseau's notion of the general will, at least insofar 
as she understands the latter as a supra-individual will that is not the (unpredictable) result of mutual 
persuasion and justification between citizens who hold different opinions, but a collective will that 
precedes individual judgement (Arendt 1963: pp. 70–74). While I am sympathetic to Arendt's view, I also 
recognise that the concept of the general will is more ambiguous than she makes out. This is a moot point, 
however, as my own argument does not rely on the concept of the generall will, however defined. 
precedes or supersedes individual judgement and agreement. The task in the rest of the 
paper is to imbue these general features with positive content. 
 
Public versus private, reasons versus pro-attitudes 
Before dealing with the distinction between public and private happiness in particular, it 
is important to make sense of the broader distinction between a personal, non-political 
sphere of life on the one hand, and a public, political sphere on the other. Feminist and 
communitarian thinkers often criticise this distinction for its „bifurcation‟ of the self into 
„abstract citizens‟ and „human beings‟ (Okin 1994: p. 29). On this view, the distinction 
between the political and the personal that characterises social contract theory renders a 
politics stripped of our most deeply held personal concerns and commitments. Such a 
politics, so the argument goes, lacks a sufficiently rich conception of the person, and 
serves to perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of certain classes, races or genders 
precisely by labelling their concerns merely „personal‟ rather than properly „political‟, 
and hence amenable to political intervention. This criticism is animated, in turn, by 
what Charles Larmore (1987: p. 76) calls „political expressivism‟ – that is, the belief 
that „our highest political ideal [must] be mirrored in our highest personal ideal‟.7 The 
guiding assumption here is that politics must in some way reflect the genuine personal 
concerns and commitments of individuals or groups if it is not to suffer from irrelevance 
or ideological blindness. 
While I certainly do not want to defend oppression or domination of any kind, and 
while I recognise that a politics that is entirely disconnected from the actual motivations 
of citizens would lack all credibility, I nevertheless think that political expressivism is 
mistaken, and that there are good reasons for separating personal and political ideals. 
These reasons have to do, in turn, with the distinction between the ends that motivate us 
and the normative justification of these ends. This point becomes clearer when 
considered in light of Thomas Scanlon's distinction between desires and reasons. In 
Scanlon's account, having a desire is simply to have a pro-attitude towards some state of 
affairs. A particular pro-attitude can be an explanation for someone undertaking a 
certain action (e.g. „I am learning to play the flute because it makes me happy‟, or 
„because it gives me pleasure‟, or „because it makes my life go better‟). The explanation 
on offer here can be termed the agent's „operative reason‟ for undertaking action X, but 
this should be distinguished from any normative reason he or she might have for doing 
so (Scanlon 1998: p. 19). A normative reason is a reason that specifies why one ought 
(not) to do something; in other words, it is a normative justification for action X, and 
not merely an account of the considerations that have played a role in someone's 
decision to do X. Justification in the normative sense comes into play when we are not 
merely focused on our self-understanding, but when we seek to justify our judgements 
of right and wrong to others. To take something to be a reason in the normative sense 
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 Theories of politics that can broadly be labelled expressivist include Elshtain (1981), Pateman (1983, 
1988), MacKinnon (1989), Okin (1989), Taylor (1989), Young (1990) and MacIntyre (2007). I am not 
claiming that any criticism of the distinction between the public and the private, or the political and the 
personal, is inevitably a form of political expressivism. My concern is with views that consider the very 
attempt to separate personal from political ideals to be morally and politically suspect. 
entails a claim about reasons that others would have under similar circumstances (ibid.: 
p. 73). While our desires or pro-attitudes play an important part in our practical 
reasoning, these cannot be offered as reasons to others where we hope to secure their 
agreement about what any of us ought (not) to do. In other words, we are called upon to 
justify our judgements of right and wrong to others precisely to the extent that we seek 
their agreement on principles for the general regulation of behaviour.
8
  
Scanlon argues further that such principles are only morally justified if they pass the 
test of reasonable rejectability; that is, if the principles on offer are such that those who 
similarly seek agreement on generally acceptable principles would have no reason to 
reject (ibid.: pp. 4, 153). „Reasonably reject‟ here has the meaning of: rejecting for 
reasons that are not limited to how this affects my interests, but that also take into 
account how rejecting a particular reason would impact on others‟ interests. While 
Scanlon does not say this explicitly, I suggest that this kind of mutual reason-giving is 
strongly recursive.
9
 In other words, I test the reasons I offer to others against my sense 
of what it would be reasonable for them to reject; their reasons for accepting or rejecting 
my reasons are again tested against what it would be reasonable for those who are 
affected by such rejection to reject in turn, and so on and so forth. 
Needless to say, these are not the only circumstances of morality: we also use 
„right‟ and „wrong‟ as terms of praise or criticism, which is not the same as offering 
normative justification for our actions or beliefs. There might also be other 
considerations besides mutual reason-giving that are relevant for determining moral 
obligation. I therefore do not claim that Scanlon's moral contractualism holds for the 
entire domain of morality.
10
 However, the distinction between reasons and desires or 
pro-attitudes is relevant in the political domain, precisely because here we do seek 
mutual agreement on collectively binding principles that can be codified into law. Of 
course, not every member of political society is motivated by a concern for such 
agreement. However, unless we think that politics can never be anything but the 
arbitrary exercise of power or a zero-sum game between competing interests, I do not 
see how we can get away from seeking general principles that we can justify to one 
another by way of mutual reasons. Since we cannot know how particular persons would 
be affected, these reasons would have to be so formulated that they can be reasonably 
accepted by (or, in Scanlon's terminology, not reasonably rejected by) any citizen. They 
would therefore have to be public rather than purely personal reasons: that is, reasons 
that are both made public, and that are formulated from a public point of view, namely 
„the point of view of you and me‟ (Rawls 1993: p. 98). Another way of putting this is to 
say that these reasons would have to be „other-centred‟ rather than „agent-centred‟. As 
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 This leaves out of account what reasons can be offered to those who are not so motivated. We might just 
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 To be fair, Scanlon himself does not claim that contractualism is the whole of morality. See Scanlon 
(1998: pp. 6–7). 
Scanlon (1998: p. 202) points out, „“others” feature twice in this schema: as those to 
whom justification is owed, and as those who might or might not be able reasonably to 
reject certain principles‟. However, it is not the mere fact of „otherness‟ that is the 
source of moral obligation, but the fact that I am seeking agreement on normative 
principles that would be collectively binding on others who are not merely „other 
selves‟, but persons in their own right, whose interests and ultimate commitments do not 
necessarily mirror my own. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to bracket „the 
reason-giving force of some of [my] own interests [ … ] and giving the interests of 
certain people or institutions a special place‟ (ibid.: p. 53). 
As I have stated above, I am not offering a wholesale defence of Scanlon's moral 
contractualism. I am relying on his argument insofar as it explains why personal ideals 
cannot provide us with an appropriate moral basis on which to establish the political 
relationship between citizens. Distinguishing between personal and political concerns 
then simply means refraining from taking personal pro-attitudes for normative reasons 
in the political domain. When understood in this way, the argument for the 
public/private, political/personal distinction is not an ideological manoeuvre aimed at 
protecting the private exercise of power from public scrutiny or keeping the legitimate 
claims of the vulnerable from being heard. Instead, it shows that the only moral 
justification for advancing a claim in favour of a particular political arrangement is that 
the reasons for this claim cannot reasonably be rejected by those to whom they apply. 
Against this background, I now propose that we understand private happiness as 
pertaining to our personal pro-attitudes, and public happiness as pertaining to the 
normative justification of the laws that bind us as citizens. Of course, I might have a 
pro-attitude towards ensuring the happiness of others. However, the moral justification 
for any principles for the general regulation of behaviour would not depend on the mere 
fact that I happen to have such a pro-attitude, but on the reasons I can offer others for 
why they ought to be bound by the principles I propose. The claim „I have your 
happiness at heart‟, taken by itself, is not a sufficient reason for someone to agree to be 
bound by the principles proposed, and the claim „This makes me unhappy‟, taken by 
itself, is not a sufficient reason for rejecting such principles. 
Still, there is nothing in the above argument to show that what starts out as a 
personal pro-attitude cannot be translated into normative reasons that could serve as a 
foundation for political agreement. Indeed, many theories of well-being are engaged in 
just such a translation project, whereby the descriptive conception of happiness is 
converted into an evaluative conception of the human good, which is then taken to 
provide an adequate normative foundation for law-making. While this might seem a 
promising strategy for linking personal and political ideals – and hence for relating 
public and private happiness – I think that there are particular features of well-being that 
militate against it being treated as a normative reason in the political domain. 
 
Reasons versus well-being 
For present purposes, I take happiness to be a descriptive term for a particular state of 
affairs – whether a mental state or a set of objective circumstances – and well-being to 
be a normative or evaluative term that defines a particular state of affairs as good in 
some sense. „Good‟ here can mean „prudentially good‟, in the sense of being „good for‟ 
or beneficial to the person who experiences it, or „morally good‟ in some way, 
irrespective of whether or not it is prudentially valuable. It is also possible to consider 
something to be morally good precisely insofar as it is prudentially good, and vice 
versa. In the final instance, however, well-being is taken to be a perfectionist ideal that 
we ought to realise if we could, either because it is beneficial for us, or because it is 
morally good, or both simultaneously.
11
  
It is tempting to think that considerations of well-being – understood as a 
conception of the human good – could provide sufficient normative justification for a 
particular politico-legal order (e.g. Nussbaum 1988, 1992, 2000: p. 116; Sumner 1996). 
Now, most of us surely care about our own well-being, and it is hard to see how any 
genuine moral concern for others could exclude a concern for their well-being. 
Nevertheless, these two facts, taken together, do not provide sufficient support for 
political expressivism. To recall: political expressivism refers to the view that our 
highest political ideals must be an extension of our highest personal ideals. Thus, if we 
take well-being to be the ultimate end of human life, expressivists would consider the 
promotion of human well-being to provide sufficient normative justification for political 
decisions. Contrary to the expressivists, I think that well-being – however highly we 
might value it – cannot be translated into collectively binding principles for law-making 
in the political domain. Given my characterisation of public happiness as the freedom to 
participate in just such law-making, this also means that well-being cannot be the source 
of public happiness. There are at least three features of the notion of well-being that 
support this view. 
Let us start by assuming, for argument's sake, that it is possible for all members of a 
polity to converge on a single conception of well-being. Why would not this be a 
sufficient reason for us to adopt personal well-being as a political principle? Because, 
for one thing, universal or near-universal agreement on the content of well-being does 
not yet make well-being into a „master-value‟, in the sense that all other values derive 
their value from the fact that they contribute to human well-being (Scanlon 1998: pp. 
107–109). It is not the case that in attaching value to anything, we are always making a 
meta-level calculation of how this would affect our overall well-being. Instead, we 
value objects, actions, people, books, experiences, beliefs, principles, and so forth for 
different reasons, some of which may – subjectively or objectively – have to do with 
our well-being, and others not. We also do not consider well-being a master-value when 
we try to work out our obligations to others. As Scanlon argues: 
The fact that someone would be willing to forgo a decent diet in order to build a 
monument to his god does not mean that his claim for aid in his project has the same 
strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat (even assuming that the sacrifices 
required on others would be the same) (Scanlon 1975: pp. 659–660). 
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 We might think, perhaps, that satisfying certain needs 
or informed preferences, or promoting certain capabilities, must always outweigh other 
kinds of reasons, precisely because they do contribute to well-being in ways that other 
values do not. However, in selecting certain needs, preferences or capabilities over 
others, we have already passed them through a „moral filter‟ that has rendered the kind 
of needs, preferences or capabilities that we think ought to be satisfied (Wolff 2003: p. 
343). This „ought‟ is not derived from a conception of well-being; instead, it prescribes 
the conception of well-being that we think can be morally justified. Opting for a 
particular conception of well-being, or for particular values that ought to be satisfied 
with reference to such a conception, depends on prior normative reasons, and not on the 
mere fact of having such a conception to begin with. 
The second feature of well-being that militates against it being employed as a 
principle of politics is that our conception of well-being, like all our values, is itself 
structured by the socio-political order under which we happen to live. As Rawls (1971: 
p. 249) points out: „[T]he social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens 
come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort 
of persons they are‟. The point here is not that well-being is in fact whatever the social 
system happens to prescribe or allow, but that we cannot deal with the question of well-
being without reflecting on the system of law in which it is embedded, since it is this 
very system that defines people's legitimate expectations. We cannot derive the 
normative validity of the principles of law from a conception of well-being that is a 
function of these very principles. Rather, the moral justification of any conception of 
well-being as a perfectionist ideal depends on the prior moral justification of the system 
of right within which such an ideal is to be realised. 
The third difficulty with taking well-being as a normative political principle has to 
do with the way in which we conceive of the unity of the person. There are two ways of 
conceiving of such a unity: on the one hand, we can think of being a person as having 
multiple aims, values, characteristics, etc., which one tries to fashion into a unity over 
the course of a life. Alternatively, we can think of the person as a given unity in which 
all aims, all aspects of one's personality, are already subjected to one dominant aim (cf. 
Rawls 1981: p. 563). On the former conception, human commitments and values are 
variable within and between persons and subject to human judgement. If we do not 
assume that there is an ultimate end at which the self cannot help but aim, we are free to 
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evaluate – and if necessary, revise – the ends and values we do in fact choose (taking 
into account, of course, that the range of values and ends that are available to be chosen 
is itself enabled and/or constrained by the socio-political order, which again turns our 
attention to the justification of this order itself). If, on the other hand, we posit a single, 
unchosen end for human life, the self is treated as independent of any antecedent moral 
structure. Contrary to the usual assumption that a conception of well-being renders an 
enriched conception of the person, conceiving of well-being outside of any prior moral 
framework leaves us with nothing more than „a bare person‟, who is assumed to have 
certain given ends, but not the means to reflect on the morality of these ends (Rawls 
1999b: p. 384).
13
 This view of the self renders an equally impoverished conception of 
politics, insofar as the latter would be primarily occupied with enabling bare persons to 
realise whatever it is they aim for, rather than with the antecedent moral structure of the 
society that shapes how we conceive of our values and our ends. On the other hand, a 
view that recognises that the aims of the self are heterogeneous and not subject to a 
master value, also recognises that persons value different things for different reasons, 
and that these reasons are themselves amenable to moral judgement. Instead of a mere 
rational calculator or an unreflective pursuer of a pre-existing end, we are presented 
with a conception of the self as a moral being, capable of critical self-reflection and of 
giving and accepting reasons that might legitimately constrain one's ends. It is precisely 
this richer conception of the self that allows us to see that there might be different 
reasons for valuing particular ends for our own sake and for justifying these to others 
with whom we share a polity. 
Proponents of well-being are likely to argue that they do not hold a conception of 
the „bare self‟ outside of any moral reasoning, since moral reasoning is itself 
constitutive of human well-being.
14
 However, this so-called „thicker‟ conception of 
well-being or human flourishing does not convince. For one thing, even if we 
considered moral reasoning to be part of the human good, this would still imply that we 
ought to value the exercise of such reason simply because it is something that we 
happen to be or to value, or cannot help being or valuing. This does not allow us to 
subject our moral reasoning itself to critical scrutiny, or to relate it to what we owe one 
another as citizens. For another, the claim that well-being can only be realised by virtue 
of the exercise of a particular kind of moral reasoning – as opposed to through violence, 
for instance – simply means that the conception of well-being has already been passed 
through an antecedent moral filter; it does not show that well-being is itself a normative 
reason. 
To summarise, there are at least three characteristics of the notion of well-being, 
understood as an evaluative conception of personal happiness, that make it an unsuitable 
foundation for public happiness: (1) well-being is not a master value, and we therefore 
cannot assume that our political arrangements (i.e. the focal point of public happiness) 
must aim at the realisation of this value; (2) starting from a conception of well-being 
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does not take sufficient account of the way in which the politico-legal order shapes our 
values and aims, and (3) well-being operates with an impoverished conception of the 
self as independent of any antecedent moral structure (or subjects our preferences and 
aims to an antecedent moral filter for which it provides no argument). None of these 
criticisms implies that we should not consider human well-being when devising laws 
and policies. What the criticisms do show, however, is that well-being does not belong 
to the structure of justification of the laws that bind us. I have argued throughout that 
such justification depends on mutual reason-giving between citizens rather than on their 
personal happiness or well-being, even if these ends are widely endorsed. I have also 
claimed that our public happiness as citizens is bound up with just such mutual 
justification of the system of right – i.e. the formal laws and rules – that governs our 
pursuit of our ends. In the final part of the paper, I now turn my attention to what such 
public justification could entail. 
 
Public happiness and public justification 
Why does normative reason-giving matter in the political domain, and how does it 
relate to public happiness? As a first step towards answering these questions, consider 
the difference between those areas of life where we think that people can be legally 
forced to comply with moral norms, and those domains of human activity that we do not 
think should be subject to legal sanction, even if, when left to their own devices, people 
sometimes (even often) do wrong (cf. Larmore 1990: p. 348). Of course, there have 
been many historical shifts in our views about where the law should and should not 
apply, and it is entirely possible that matters that currently fall outside the sphere of the 
law might in future become matters for legal sanction, and vice versa. In other words, 
the distinction between the personal and the political is itself a matter of political 
judgement and not ontology.
15
 Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the point that a 
constitutional state is founded upon a distinction between moral principles that can be 
legitimately enforced by law, and other moral principles, perhaps belonging to a more 
comprehensive moral vision, with which people cannot legally be forced to comply. 
Laws coerce in a way that general moral norms do not, since the law represents the joint 
power of all the citizens to impose certain duties upon one another.
16
 Precisely because 
the law, unlike more general moral norms or beliefs, binds all members of a political 
society equally, the law must be justifiable to each of them. It is unhelpful to say that 
the law could only be justified if it did not coerce. This assumes that human beings 
could live together on a large scale without anyone ever being compelled to do what 
they do not want to do, or to refrain from doing what they would like to do. Apart from 
this assumption being at odds with lived experience, it does not resolve the question of 
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 I do not mean to imply that non-legal norms do not coerce. My claim has to do with the nature and the 
source of the coercion. There is a difference between following a norm due to pressure by one's family 
and/or associates, and following a norm because one is legally compelled to do so. Moreover, since the 
former type of coercion is often a consequence of the latter, it is especially important to ensure that legal 
coercion is, in fact, morally justified. 
what would legitimise any kind of legal sanction if at any point the interests, aims, 
beliefs or commitments of the members of a society did diverge. However, legitimacy 
versus coercion is a false dichotomy. We are not faced with a choice between an 
impossible co-existence beyond the law and domination under the law, but with the task 
of working out the conditions for the legitimate exercise of the collective power of all 
over each. 
I have argued that the primary condition in this regard is the mutual reason-giving 
between citizens, rather than a conception of well-being or some other common end. 
Since the law applies to all, the reasons in defence or criticism of these laws must 
appeal to sufficiently general principles rather than being tied to particular ends or 
social roles. Moreover, these have to be normative reasons that cannot reasonably be 
rejected by those to whom they apply. This kind of recursive reason-giving matters 
apart from the specific outcomes achieved, since the kind of reasons citizens offer to 
one another impacts on how they view themselves vis-à-vis their fellows. Stated 
differently, the reasons we offer to others in justification of any law or political 
arrangement express a particular attitude on the part of the reason-giver towards the 
recipient: respect, if one treats others as if they are deserving of reasons that they can 
themselves endorse on reasonable grounds, or contempt, if one expects others to accept 
reasons that they cannot reasonably be expected to endorse.
17
 What is at issue here is 
not the assurance that the reasons presented will be accepted, but the consideration of 
the kind of reasons that may legitimately be offered to others to begin with. It is an 
expression of contempt to present others with reasons the acceptance of which would 
require them to also accept that they are less deserving of moral regard than the reason-
giver or their fellow citizens at large – even if they are free to reject these reasons. 
(Their acceptance of these reasons would not mitigate the wrong either. There is nothing 
laudable about persuading others to concur with the contempt one has for them.) 
There is a direct link between this kind of recursive reason-giving and the 
conception of public happiness that I have defended throughout. It is by virtue of their 
mutual reason-giving that citizens treat one another as equally competent decision-
makers rather than as beneficiaries, and thus grant each other a share in political affairs 
(Ottonelli 2012: p. 202). However, treating each other as equally competent decision-
makers does not have to follow from an initial sincere belief in equal competence. What 
matters for the political relationship between citizens is respect in the performative 
sense rather than as an expression of an authentic belief (ibid.). Needless to say, this 
claim runs counter to the tenets of political expressivism, which requires that our 
political ideals must be an extension of our genuinely held personal beliefs and 
commitments. However, while it may be true that not all citizens are equally endowed 
with the ability to make competent decisions or to give and understand reasons, this is 
not yet an argument against treating them as such. In the first place, we cannot know 
who does or does not have such competence in advance; we therefore have no option 
but to proceed as if everyone is an equally competent judge of reasons. In the second 
place, as I have already shown, the offering of reasons does not depend on the guarantee 
that the other party will accept them. The suspicion that someone is not a competent 
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judge of reasons therefore does not relieve the reason-giver from the moral requirement 
to present the recipient with reasons that would pass the test of reasonable rejectability. 
Finally, while we may not all start out as equally competent decision-makers, the only 
way of learning how to make competent decisions is by being exposed to the standards 
of reason-giving required for making such decisions; that is to say, „being treated as an 
equally competent agent is a preliminary condition for becoming one‟ (ibid.: p. 214).18  
In light of the above, we can now say that the necessary conditions for public 
happiness are (1) that persons conceive of themselves as citizens related through the 
system of law that specifies their rights and obligations and (2) that they conceive of the 
law as justified by normative reasons which they mutually endorse. Ultimately, what is 
at issue here is the quality of the relation between citizens as givers and receivers of 
reasons. The relation itself is a contractual one, insofar as it involves mutual obligations 
specified by law, and depends on the distinction between personal ends and the system 
of right that circumscribes those ends. This contractualist view of our civic bond does 
not assume the existence of an actual contract; instead, the idea of the contract is a 
standard against which to judge the moral worth of our existing political arrangements. 
The contract so understood is not a bargain, in which each party tries to push their self-
interest until someone pushes back, but a normative framework of law that constrains 
the claims that citizens may advance vis-à-vis one another. Of course, insofar as 
justification of the law depends on recursive reason-giving, in which the reasons I 
present to you are in turn accepted in light of reasons that I (and others) cannot 
reasonably reject, and so on, it means that the law is always only provisionally justified. 
But that is as it should be: history has shown all too clearly the price we pay for 
mistaking human laws for transcendent authority. 
The final question I want to address concerns the relationship between public and 
private happiness. From what has gone before, it might appear that I have set up public 
and private happiness in opposition to one another and, moreover, that I have privileged 
the former over the latter. In that case, wouldn't we have to consider a society in which 
everyone endorses the law, but whose members are personally unhappy or deficient in 
well-being, as morally better than a society with higher levels of personal 
happiness/well-being, but less political freedom? I concede that some such conclusion is 
entailed by my argument, since I do not think that the measured or reported levels of 
happiness or well-being in the population can provide the final moral justification for 
the social order as a whole (although, of course, I do not claim that public endorsement 
of the law can provide such final justification either). To see the point, imagine a society 
in which all members are maximally happy according to their preferred definition of 
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happiness, but in which they are so due to the voluntary benevolence of a benign 
dictator, who arranges everything with a view to the well-being of all its members. Now 
compare this to a society whose members are as happy as it is possible for them to be 
within the framework of the system of law in which they are co-decision-makers rather 
than recipients of benevolence. The difference between these two (admittedly 
counterfactual) societies is that, in the first case, the citizens consent to external rule for 
the sake of having their existing preferences or conception of the good satisfied, and the 
happiness of each is granted through the goodwill of the ruler. In the second case, 
citizens rule themselves, and their conception of the good and its satisfaction are 
constrained by the requirement for mutual justification – precisely because there is no 
higher authority to which they can appeal.
19
 In this case, citizens grant each other 
happiness within normative constraints that they themselves endorse. We can say, 
therefore, that their public happiness consists precisely in the freedom to decide the 
system of right that constrains their private happiness. 
This is not the final word on the matter, however. After all, we are both citizens 
with a stake in law-giving and flesh-and-blood human beings concerned with our own 
ends. To demand that we sacrifice our own happiness for the sake of a merely formal 
civic relationship seems both unrealistic and unreasonable. Hence, rather than a straight-
up choice between public and private happiness, I propose that we aim for reflective 
equilibrium between happiness from a first-person point of view and happiness from the 
point of view of the citizen, analogous to Rawls's suggested procedure for reconciling 
our comprehensive moral views with the political conception of justice (Rawls 1971: 
pp. 19–21, 48–51; 1993: p. 28ff.; 1999a: p. 288ff.). While I cannot provide a full 
account of this procedure here, it would entail working back-and-forth between our 
personal conceptions of happiness, whatever these might be, and the reasons we can 
offer our fellow must be subjected to the test of mutual justification. 
citizens for the system of law that shapes our values and our ends, refashioning each 
in light of the other, until the point at which they cohere.
20
 Thus, I start out with the 
things I happen to value (e.g. wealth, status, power, employment, love, pleasure, 
security, etc.) and my operative reasons for valuing them (because they contribute to my 
happiness or well-being), and then ask: what normative reasons – i.e. reasons that pass 
the test of reasonable rejectability – can I offer my fellow citizens in justification of a 
particular law that would enable me to realise these ends? Clearly, the mere fact that I 
happen to have these ends could not do the work, nor could any reasons that would 
require others to sacrifice their happiness/well-being in service of my own. It would be 
a different matter, though, if I could show that my achieving a particular end would 
enhance the capability of others to do the same – not only for them to achieve what I 
happen to value, but to achieve what they might value. Moreover, others‟ acceptance or 
rejection of the reasons I offer them would have to take into account how their rejection 
or acceptance would affect everyone to whom the proposed policy or law is meant to 
                                                          
19
 While I cannot pursue this here, there are obvious correlations between this argument and the 
„neorepublicanism‟ advocated by Philip Pettit and others. See, for example, Pettit (1997) and Lovett & 
Pettit (2009). 
20
 For an extensive treatment of refl ective equilibrium, see Daniels (1996). 
apply. Reflective equilibrium between private and public happiness would then entail 
that we revise our conceptions of the kind of happiness to which we may aspire in light 
of normative reasons for law-making in the political domain, and revise our laws so as 
to take into account the many sources of private happiness. 
Of course, this is an ideal model. Realistically speaking, perfect coherence between 
private and public happiness is likely to remain out of reach. Nevertheless, an ideal does 
not have to be fully realisable in the world for it to be action-guiding. Why should we 
not do the best we can to justify our personal conceptions of happiness to those with 
whom we share a polity, even if neither we nor they are perfect moral agents? More to 
the point: what reasons can we give each other for not doing our best in this regard? 
 
Conclusion 
I have defended a conception of public happiness as the freedom (understood as both a 
right and a practice) of citizens to decide on the laws that define their rights and duties 
as citizens. It should be clear from my argument that this does not have to involve actual 
law-making – although the point would hold for this case as well – but concerns the 
mutual justification of such laws. This justification, in turn, requires a recursive process 
of normative reason-giving, whereby citizens are able to conceive of themselves as co-
decision-makers in the political domain. I have argued that public happiness so defined 
differs from happiness understood from a first-person perspective; that is, it is not a 
matter of what we happen to feel, want, need, prefer, aim for, desire, believe or value, 
but of our freedom to decide on the laws under which we must live. This freedom is not 
granted to us by any higher authority; rather, it is what citizens grant one another when 
they reason together about the laws that bind them. The object of this reasoning process 
is not the realisation of any particular human end, but the mutual justification of the 
framework of law in which our many ends are conceived and pursued. Finally, public 
happiness in this sense should not be conceived in opposition to private or personal 
happiness. Instead, I have suggested that we ought to strive for a reflective equilibrium 
between private and public happiness, so that we neither reduce the world we share with 
others to our privately owned place within it, nor blithely sacrifice the desires, 
commitments and ends that give our lives both substance and depth. 
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